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Ferguson v Avelo Mortgage, LLC

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), as original lender’s
nominee and beneficiary under deed of trust, and its later assignee had
authority to initiate foreclosure proceedings and invoke the tender rule
against tenants seeking quiet title again

In November 2006, Owner bought Home, with New Century Mortgage Company as
lender, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as lender’s nominee and
beneficiary under the deed of trust, and First American Title as trustee. On August 2,
2007, Avelo Mortgage executed a substitution of trustee, replacing First American with
Quality Loan Service Corporation. On August 22, 2007, MERS assigned its interest
under the deed of trust to Avelo. After delinquent loan payments, Quality delivered a
notice of sale to Owner on November 4, 2007. The substitution of trustee (from First
American to Quality) was recorded on November 9, 2007; on that same day, the notice of
sale was recorded. Avelo purchased Home in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale in July 2008
for $400,000 (roughly 60 percent of the amount of unpaid debt and costs).
From the time of initial purchase, Tenants had been occupying Home. On June 27, 2009,
Owner executed a quitclaim deed to Tenants. On October 8, 2009, Tenants brought a
quiet title action against Avelo. Avelo successfully demurred that, as a prerequisite,
neither Tenants nor Owner had tendered the full amount due on the loan, and because the
sale had terminated Owner’s interest, the postsale quitclaim deed transferred nothing to
Tenants. Tenants appealed, arguing that Avelo was not the holder of the promissory note
and thus could not invoke the tender rule against them. The court of appeal affirmed both
the demurrer without leave to amend and the judgment for Avelo.
On an issue of first impression, the court held that MERS and its valid assignee, Avelo,
had authority to initiate foreclosure proceedings and invoke the tender rule against
Tenants, even when neither held the original promissory note. The deed of trust
specifically allowed MERS to initiate foreclosure proceedings. Under persuasive federal
case law, it is not necessary that MERS or Avelo, as its assignee, have possession of the
original promissory note as a precondition to a nonjudicial foreclosure under the deed of
trust. The court characterized the argument that MERS or Avelo must have possession of
the promissory note as a “legal loophole,” benefiting defaulting borrowers and their
successors, that was not supported by any legal authority.
Although Avelo did not have authority to substitute trustees initially, rendering the notice
of default defective, Owner had 3 months before the notice of sale to cure his default.
Further, when Avelo did become beneficiary under the deed of trust on August 22, 2007,
the recordation of the trustee substitution on November 9, 2007, became effective and

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1956265

was valid. Because the foreclosure sale occurred in July 2008, the sale was completed
with a valid, existing trustee. Tenants were bound by the equitable tender rule, even
though they were not the original borrowers, because they stood in the shoes of Owner as
owners in possession of the property. (Note: As owners in possession arguing that Avelo
had no legal or equitable right to foreclose, Tenants sufficiently pleaded their quiet title
action.)
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: If two decisions constitute a trend, then the combination of this
case with Gomes v Countrywide (reported in the May 2011 Reporter) should tell us that
the California state appellate courts are going in the opposite direction of many federal
bankruptcy court decisions and are generally upholding secondary market transfers
involving the MERS System even when there is something dubiously fishy in the
transaction (as when, such as here, the new lender substituted in a different trustee before
the deed of trust had been actually assigned to it).
What this decision also adds to the judicial rehabilitation of MERS is that the new lender
can demand that the trustor tender the loan funds as a precondition for challenging its
foreclosure, notwithstanding the trustor’s argument that the assignment from MERS
covered only the deed of trust and not the promissory note (which MERS never
possessed), putting into doubt the question of whether the foreclosing lender actually
does possess the underlying note.
(Use of the tender defense in these circumstances has almost more of a poetic-justice
logic than any solid legal justification—it being so often raised in response to the
trustor’s attempt to stop the foreclosure by the “show me the note” defense. Neither of
these challenges—not “show me the note” or “show me you can tender the debt”—has
much to do with the real merits of most foreclosure fights; they serve too often as dodges
to avert attention from the real substantive issues of whether the trustor actually does owe
the money or whether the lender actually is entitled to the money.)
The tender defense has always seemed troublesome to me. In many mortgage challenge
cases, a court should not quiet the mortgagor’s title without also, at the same time,
recognizing the validity of the mortgagee’s debt, but when that debt is not yet
immediately due, why should the mortgagor be required to tender it in full at the outset of
the litigation? Too many appellate opinions dogmatically state this as a requirement
without adequate explanation (or find some way to avoid applying it when it appears
inconvenient). Practitioners deserve more certainty as to why, how, or when a tender
requirement applies.
PS: I mentioned earlier in this Take that the federal courts appear to be going in a
somewhat different direction, which is best illustrated by this excerpt from a recent
opinion from the Central District of California (Cruz v Wachovia Mortgage (CD Cal,
Mar. 8, 2011, No. CV 10–3412 AHM (JEMx)) 2011 US Dist Lexis 24784), following its
dismissal of a trustor’s challenge to a foreclosure on preemption grounds, but then
turning to the question of attorney fees for the lender:
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Now Wells Fargo Bank seeks to punish Plaintiffs for daring to sue it. Why does a giant bank like Wells Fargo seek to
recover $18,552.50 from struggling plaintiffs who probably never understood, must less commissioned, the ill-advised
theories and pleadings their lawyer came up with? Perhaps because it wishes to obtain a precedent that banks could use
to deter unsophisticated borrowers like Plaintiffs from suing them. If that was its intention, Wells Fargo picked the
wrong case and the wrong court....
These fee-shifting recitals are fine print, boilerplate clauses in complicated legal instruments that, from a practical point
of view, are tantamount to contracts of adhesion. How many consumers read such fine print? How many understand it?
Plaintiffs are already facing the loss of their home. To saddle them with nearly $20,000 in attorneys’ fees sought by a
giant financial institution merely because they had the temerity to file a lawsuit would be worse than inequitable and
unreasonable; it would be a travesty.

Attorneys scheduled to appear before Judge Matz in the Central District: Be warned.—
Roger Bernhardt

